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Comment: Understanding Xenophobia
as Intersectional Discrimination
Shreya Atrey*
Abstract
This Comment examines the nature of xenophobia and why
it seems to fall through the cracks of international human rights
law, especially as a form of racial discrimination under the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. It considers an understanding of
xenophobia as a sui generis case of intersectional discrimination
because it has to do with racial grounds but also perhaps other
grounds (such as nationality, religion, language, culture, and
class), which makes it difficult to disentangle the basis of
xenophobic discrimination as based on strictly racial grounds
alone.
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INTRODUCTION

Xenophobia as a category of discrimination remains elusive
in international human rights law. Colloquially understood as
the fear of or hatred of “the outsider,”1 xenophobia escapes legal
recognition and, ultimately, redressal because it does not map
onto a protected “ground” easily. It is legally recognized only
when it is based on traditional grounds such as color or ethnic
origin; that is, when it is shown that an instance of xenophobic
discrimination is not simply about treatment based on outsider
status but based on racial grounds per se.2 But the move to make
xenophobia “fit” the mold of racial discrimination belies what is
significant about xenophobia: that although it often comes
entangled with racial grounds such as ethnicity, color, descent,
or national origin, it also comes entangled with other grounds
such as religion, culture, language, class, etc.; and that racial
and non-racial grounds cannot be disentangled from one
another.
This Comment argues that xenophobia can be addressed as
discrimination, especially racial discrimination, only when its
sui generis nature is understood in these intersectional terms.
Further, the impact of xenophobia can be understood as pushing
its victims to the margins of a political community, thus creating
an underclass or group defined by an admixture of grounds,
including racial grounds. Appreciating the nature of xenophobic
discrimination in this way holds the key to addressing it in
international law.
I.

XENOPHOBIA AS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NOBODY

In 2001, members of the Progressive Party of Denmark
made certain remarks at their annual conference.3 Someone

1. OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR HUM. RTS. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION, RACISM, DISCRIMINATION, AND XENOPHOBIA 2 (2001),
https://perma.cc/78EM-MFPD (PDF) (describing xenophobia as “behaviour
specifically based on the perspective that the other is foreign to or originates
from outside the community or nation”).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Kamal
Quereshi v. Denmark, ¶ 2.5, Opinion of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination Under Article 14 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc.
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compared “Mohammedans and rats,” another recommended
genocide of “Mohammedans,” and yet another suggested that
“Mohammedans will exterminate populations of the countries to
which they have advanced.”4 Others spoke more generally. One
Mr. Andreasen remarked, “The State has given the foreigners
work. They work in our slaughterhouses where they can easily
poison our food and endanger the agricultural exports.”5 While
other speakers were prosecuted for their remarks, Mr.
Andreasen was not.6 The Regional Public Prosecutor could not
determine who, if anyone, Mr. Andreasen’s statement injured,
since it did not refer to “a specific group of people characterized
by race, color, national or ethnic origin to constitute race
discrimination.”7 The United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“the Committee”) agreed.
It held that “a general reference to foreigners does not at present
single out a group of persons . . . on the basis of a specific race,
ethnicity, color, descent[,] or national or ethnic origin,” and
therefore Mr. Andreasen’s statement did not constitute racial
discrimination for the purposes of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination8
(CERD).9
In 2007, the Committee reiterated this position, this time to
declare that even specific (Islamophobic) references to Muslims,
the Quran, and Arabs were insufficient to single out a group of
persons that fell within the scope of CERD.10 Instead, the
Committee observed that

CERD/C/66/D/33/2003 (Mar. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Quereshi v. Denmark]
(describing the remarks made at the annual meeting).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. ¶ 2.13 (describing the decision to withdraw charges).
7. Id. ¶ 4.7
8. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. No. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
[hereinafter CERD].
9. Quereshi v. Denmark, supra note 3, ¶ 7.3.
10. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, A.W.R.A.P.
v. Denmark, ¶ 6.4, Opinion of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination Under Article 14 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/71/D/37/2006 (Aug.
8, 2007) [hereinafter A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark] (concluding that “general
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no specific national or ethnic groups were directly targeted
as such by these [references]. In fact, the Committee notes
that the Muslims currently living in [Denmark] are of
heterogeneous origin. They originate from at least 15
different countries, are of diverse national and ethnic
origins, and consist of non-citizens, and Danish citizens,
including Danish converts.11

In 2009, the Committee again declined to find any
discrimination in a statement referring to persons from “Somali
clubs” as having been behind an attack, since the statement “did
not make any disparaging or degrading remarks about persons
of Somali origin.”12
More recently, in 2017, the Committee upheld the decision
of a municipal assembly in Switzerland to deny naturalization
to a resident due to the lack of evidence of “integration.”13 On
record were statements made by members of the assembly that
“Kosovo-Albanians left a bitter taste in the mouth,”14 and that
the resident was only “applying for naturalization to abuse the
social security system.”15 The Committee was unconvinced that
the statements were based on race, color, descent, or national or
ethnic origin, and thus reaffirmed the assembly’s assessment
that the resident simply “had not been integrated locally” and
was still an outsider attempting to access naturalization in
Switzerland.16
references to Muslims” do not “single out a particular group of persons” and
referencing its prior decision in Quereshi v. Denmark).
11. Id. ¶ 6.2.
12. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Ahmed Farah
Jama v. Denmark, ¶ 7.4, Opinion of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination Under Article 14 of the International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/75/D/41/2008 (Aug.
21, 2009).
13. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Benon Pjetri
v. Switzerland, ¶ 7.6, Opinion Adopted by the Committee Under Article 14 of
the Convention, Concerning Communication No. 53/2013, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/91/D/53/2013 (Jan. 23, 2017) (“[T]he Committee considers that the
information provided by the parties does not demonstrate that the rejection of
the petitioner’s application for naturalization was based on discriminatory
criteria linked to his national or ethnic origin.”).
14. Id. ¶ 2.4.
15. Id. ¶ 3.3.
16. Id. ¶ 7.6; see also Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
A.M.M. v. Switzerland, ¶¶ 8.6, 9–11, Opinion of the Committee on the
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In the Committee’s view, none of these instances were
instances of discrimination based on racial grounds. “General”
references to migrants, foreigners and non-citizens, or even
Arabs, Somalis and Kosovo-Albanians, were not considered to
“single out a group of persons, contrary to Article 1 of the
Convention, on the basis of a specific race, ethnicity, color,
descent or national or ethnic origin.”17 According to the
Committee, migrants or foreigners could be of any nationality,
color, ethnicity and religion; but importantly, the discriminator
could have the same nationality, color, ethnicity, and religion as
those they were discriminating against.18 With too many
differences within the group of actual or perceived foreigners,
and with too little difference between the discriminator and
those facing discrimination, any distinction between the two
groups was thus considered fictitious, and in any case not one
based on racial grounds—namely, race, ethnicity, color, descent,
or national or ethnic origin.19 And in the absence of such a
distinction based on racial grounds, no racial discrimination
could be found.20
II.

XENOPHOBIA AS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

There is no doubt that the instances described in Part I are
instances of xenophobia, understood as the dislike of or
prejudice against actual or perceived foreigners.21 A strong link
exists between the treatment of foreigners (refugees,
asylum-seekers, displaced persons, and other migrants) and the
violation of their human rights, whether in the form of overt
hostility or violence, or in the form of discrimination in accessing

Elimination of Racial Discrimination Under Article 14 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/84/D/50/2012 (Mar. 11, 2014) (noting that, while the Committee
encouraged Switzerland to reexamine its “temporary admission” status
program, the program itself did not constitute discrimination).
17. Quershi v. Denmark, supra note 3, ¶ 7.3 n.1.
18. A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, supra note 10, ¶ 6.2 n.5.
19. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21. For a general discussion of the link between migrant or foreigner
status and xenophobia and racial discrimination, see OFF. U.N. HIGH COMM’N
FOR HUM. RTS. ET AL., supra note 1.
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housing, employment, or healthcare.22 But there is doubt as to
whether these are instances of racial discrimination, especially
under CERD. For example, the Committee did not identify them
as racial discrimination because, in each case, it determined
that the petitioners did not show that a distinction was made
that mapped onto a distinction identified in Article 1 of CERD
as based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin.23
According to the Committee, whatever these instances were,
they were not instances of racial discrimination prohibited by
CERD.24
This is despite the fact that it is agreed, not least by the
Committee itself,25 that cases of xenophobia can be cases of
racial discrimination.26 According to the Durban Declaration,
“xenophobia against non-nationals, particularly migrants,
refugees[,] and asylum-seekers, constitutes one of the main
sources of contemporary racism.”27 Xenophobia has since been
22. JONATHAN CRUSH & SUJATA RAMACHANDRAN, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME,
XENOPHOBIA, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 3–6
(2009), https://perma.cc/9JBL-S5NL (PDF).
23. See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
24. See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
25. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gen.
Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens 1, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004) (acknowledging that “xenophobia against
non-nationals, particularly migrants, refugees[,] and asylum-seekers,
constitutes one of the main sources of contemporary racism”).
26. See E. Tendayi Achiume (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms
of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance),
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance,
Follow-Up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme
of Action, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/52 (Apr. 25, 2018) [hereinafter Follow-Up
to the Durban Declaration] (noting that “achieving racial equality requires
robust action” addressing “explicit racism and xenophobia”); E. Tendavi
Achiume (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance), Promotion and
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/50 (May
3, 2016) (noting that “[x]enophobia intersects with racism in so far as the
(racialized) other is also seen as an outsider or foreign and is feared or is
perceived to be a threat”); World Conference Against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, Durban Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF189/12 (Sept. 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Durban Declaration and Programme of Action] (recognizing
xenophobia as one of the main sources of contemporary racism).
27. Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 26, ¶ 16.
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progressively understood as overlapping with or similar to racial
discrimination,28 indicating a clear link between the two.29 What
exactly is this link between xenophobia and racial
discrimination?
In and of itself, xenophobia is a broad category of
discrimination which “otherizes” people on the basis of
membership in a political community.30 At its heart is the notion
of belongingness to a political community such that, as Tendayi
Achiume helpfully describes, “the relevant membership unit is
typically though not exclusively the nation-state.”31 Actual or
perceived foreigners are understood in reference to the political
idea of who belongs within the borders of a nation-state or a
political community and who does not.32 Different combinations
of characteristics such as race, color, descent, national or ethnic
origin, religion, culture, class, and language contribute to the
idea of belongingness.33 The idea is thus intersectionally
constituted. In fact, intersecting characteristics such as race,
culture, religion, or language are brought up only in the service
of the idea of belongingness to a political community, such that
the idea assumes categorical significance of its own in

28. PATRICK THORNBERRY, THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY 155
(2016).
29. For a discussion of the historical roots of the link between xenophobia
and racism, see Robert Bernasconi, Where Is Xenophobia in the Fight against
Racism?, 2 CRITICAL PHIL. RACE 5 (2014).
30. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
31. E. Tendayi Achiume, Governing Xenophobia, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 333, 353 (2018); see also E. Tendayi Achiume, Beyond Prejudice: Structural
Xenophobic Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO J. INT’L L. 323, 329
(2014) [hereinafter Beyond Prejudice] (noting that the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees has added nationality to the list of grounds on
which xenophobic harm can be based).
32. See Nira Yuval-Davis, Women, Citizenship and Difference, 57
FEMINIST REV. 3, 5 (1997) (defining citizenship as linked “to membership in a
community rather than to the state”). For an understanding of this political
idea of belongingness, see generally BRIDGET ANDERSON, US AND THEM? THE
DANGEROUS POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL (2013).
33. Yuval-Davis, supra note 32, at 16 (noting that these characteristics
“are important factors in determining the relationship of people to their
communities and states”).
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demarcating people independently of the characteristics which
constitute it.34
Seen this way, xenophobia appears uncontrovertibly akin to
racism, broadly defined as the preference for one class of persons
based on their inherited features such as color or membership
in an ethnic or cultural group. The two are similar in terms of
how they are constituted by notions of color, descent, and
national or ethnic origin—characteristics which are often
indistinguishable from religion, culture, language, and
citizenship35—and what they are constituted for: to express
preference for or superiority of one class of persons over
another.36 Even though xenophobia is expressed more generally
as against “foreigners” or “outsiders,”37 while racism is defined
narrowly and along the four grounds listed in CERD (color,
descent, and national or ethnic origin),38 it is the larger purpose
behind racism and xenophobia—to effect a distinction between
one group of people from “the Other” based on certain inherited
characteristics—that underlies both.39 Thus, although
xenophobia and racism may be distinct wrongs, they share a
“family resemblance”40 in at least two respects: first, both
xenophobia and racism seem to be related to race even though
the former is based on a combination of intersecting grounds and
the latter is exclusively based on racial grounds; and second, the
34. See, e.g., id. at 10 (describing the collectivization of populations by
their ethnic or racial identities and the attribution of “collective needs, based
on their different cultures” to these populations).
35. See Patrick Thornberry, Forms of Hate Speech and the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 5 RELIG. &
HUM. RTS. 97, 114 (2010) (“[S]ince the bases of racism may be ethnic and
cultural hostility as much as ‘race’ or colour, the norms and spiritual practices
integral to group identity are likely to be subjected to the same discrimination
as other facts of culture.”).
36. See generally MARK BELL, RACISM AND EQUALITY IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION (2009).
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. CERD, supra note 8, art. 1.1.
39. See Sandra Fredman, Equality: A New Generation?, 40 INDUS. L.J.
145, 148 (2001) (describing racism as “not about objective characteristics,
but . . . about hatred of the ‘Other’ in defence of ‘Self’” and suggesting the
existence of “cultural racisms” in addition to “colour racism”).
40. Ali Rattansi, Just Framing: Ethnicities and Racisms in a
“Postmodern” Framework, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY
POLITICS 253 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
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two seem to broadly relate to processes of othering and
exclusion, demarcating who belongs to a particular society,
community, or territory in a chiefly political sense.41 The
question that arises then is if xenophobia can be understood
thus and in terms of its family resemblance with racism, why is
it so hard to establish xenophobic discrimination as a matter of
racial discrimination?
III. XENOPHOBIA AS INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
In the set of Committee views recounted above, foreigners
are couched as ungrateful and threatening: Muslims and Arabs
are stereotyped as wife-beaters, Somali clubs are branded as
precarious spots harboring assaulters, and long-term
permanent residents are dubbed outsiders and denied
naturalization for not having integrated.42 Essentially, these
stereotypes and negative judgments push those considered
foreigners or outsiders to the fringes of the life of a community,
and thus have a real impact on their participation in community
life, whether it is participation in the labor market as workers,
the formation of meaningful relationships with others, or
contribution as stakeholders in the wider civic life around
them.43
But the Committee frequently fails to appreciate this
impact as discrimination because it insists on mapping
instances of xenophobia onto a single racial ground defined
exclusively by ethnicity, color, descent, or national origin rather
than appreciating their intersectional bases.44 It thus tries to
41. For discussions of the interconnections between racism and ideas
surrounding the nation, ethnicity, culture, gender, and the state, see generally
STUART HALL, THE FATEFUL TRIANGLE: RACE, ETHNICITY, NATION (2017);
LEONORE DAVIDOFF & CATHERINE HALL, FAMILY FORTUNES: MEN AND WOMEN OF
THE ENGLISH MIDDLE CLASS 1780–1850 (3d ed. 2018); CATHERINE HALL,
CIVILISING SUBJECTS: METROPOLE AND COLONY IN THE ENGLISH IMAGINATION
1830–1867 (2002); FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, RACIALIZED
BOUNDARIES: RACE, NATION, GENDER, COLOUR AND CLASS AND THE ANTI-RACIST
STRUGGLE (1992).
42. See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Achiume, Beyond Prejudice, supra note 31, at 338 (describing
the “explicitly communicated prejudice on the part of employers who, on the
basis of this prejudice, refuse to employ” refugees and asylum seekers despite
a labor shortage in South Africa).
44. See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
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compare those discriminated against with another group which
does not share these characteristics, to judge whether they were
discriminated against on racial grounds in particular.45 This
comparative exercise proves futile since the two groups appear
to not be so neatly distinguishable on racial grounds.46 Victims
of xenophobia are co-constituted by a whole range of
characteristics—cutting across identity categories such as
indigenous peoples, naturalized persons, second- or
third-generation citizens, non-citizens, migrant workers,
undocumented persons, religious minorities, refugees and
asylum seekers, linguistic minorities, and more, as well as racial
(ethnicity, color, descent, or national origin) and non-racial
(religion, language, class, or culture) grounds of discrimination.
But absent a clear set of distinguishing characteristics that
define victims of xenophobia in comparison with others, the
Committee finds no discrimination, or at least none within the
contours of CERD.47
The Committee reasons this way because that is how
comparison works traditionally in discrimination law.
Discrimination is established via the comparator test, which
helps identify not only the “ground” of discrimination but also
helps appreciate whether one group is left worse off than
another on the basis of that ground.48 Indeed, discrimination
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
48. For leading judicial statutory formulations of the comparator tests in
various international contexts, see Equality Act 2010, c. 15, § 13 (UK),
https://perma.cc/BF5V-2ST9 (defining direct discrimination as “[a] person (A)
discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristics, A
treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others”); Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (defining disparate
treatment as “[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” and noting
that “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical”); Hodge v. Canada, [2004]
S.C.R. 357, 360–61 (Can.) (“Claims of discrimination . . . can only be evaluated
‘by comparison with the condition of others in the social and political setting
in which the question arises.’” (quoting Andrews v. L. Soc’y of B.C., [1989] 1.
S.C.R. 143, 164 (Can.))); Mem. of the Exec. Council for Educ.: KwaZulu-Natal
v. Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) at para. 41 (S. Afr.) (defining discrimination as
“any act or omission . . . which directly or indirectly imposes burdens,
obligations or disadvantage on, or withholds benefits, opportunities or
advantages from, any person on more or more of the prohibited grounds”
(quoting Equality Act 4 of 2000 § 1 (S. Afr.))).
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exists when a particular group is said to have been
disadvantaged in comparison to another on the basis of a clearly
identifiable personal characteristic such as race or sex.49
Discrimination as an idea is thus based on determinable social
groups or binaries such as white-Black or male-female such that
it is mainly comparison across these cognate groups which
establishes discrimination.50 While discrimination law
appreciates that groups can be diverse from within, such that
both white people and Black people can have many religions,
disabilities, ages, genders, and sexualities, they are at least not
meant to be diverse or overlapping in relation to the ground in
question. Thus, white people and Black people (or indeed Asian
people, Brown people, and others) are distinguishable, despite
the diversity of, for example, genders which constitute these
groups, because they are believed to have completely different
“race” or “color.” The same holds for sex—that no matter other
shared characteristics between men and women, such as
religion or culture, they are at least wholly distinguishable in
one respect: their sex.
This traditional heuristic comparison appears to be, first
and foremost, a misfit in the case of xenophobic discrimination,
which is intersectional in nature—and, in any event, overstated
in the case of traditional grounds and discrimination based on
them. The comparator test seems to be a misfit for intersectional
discrimination such as xenophobic discrimination, which
implicates not one but several intersecting grounds at once.51
Actual or perceived foreign status of any kind (as a refugee,
asylum-seeker, displaced person, immigrant, migrant, or
non-citizen) is a category constituted by grounds related to race
(color, descent, ethnicity, and national origin) and other grounds
(such as religion, culture, region, or language). Understanding
xenophobia
intersectionally
entails
appreciating
how
xenophobia is often co-constituted: not simply by the status of
individuals who lack the nationality or citizenship of a state and
form an amorphous category of “foreigners,” but specifically how
this lack of nationality and citizenship can become bound up

49. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
50. TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 29–31 (2015).
51. See generally Shreya Atrey, Comparison in Intersectional
Discrimination, 38 L. STUD. 379 (2018).
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with racial differences in terms of perceived color, descent,
ethnicity, and national origin, as well as non-racial differences
of religion, culture, language, and so on.52 Causally speaking,
because xenophobia is co-constituted by these many grounds at
once, it is difficult (if not impossible) in a specific case to
determine the basis of xenophobia as embedded necessarily or
mainly in one or more racial grounds; just as, for example, it is
difficult to exactly ascertain the basis of ethnonationalism or
right-wing populism which fuels Islamophobia or antisemitism
for the purposes of racial discrimination (as opposed to
discrimination based on religion).53 In fact, interchangeable
references to “Mohammedans” or “Somali clubs” as “the Other,”
“the Foreigners,” or “Them” (in opposition to “Us”) show the
co-constituted nature of these categories cutting across religion,
nationality, national origin, and race, all at the same time. What
appears quite unfruitful is the exercise of trying to decipher if
these references are based on a single racial ground alone.
Instead, discrimination can be fruitfully proven by looking
to the effects of drawing a distinction between actual or
perceived foreigners and others, and understanding whether
those effects have anything to do with racial grounds in a
specific context. Xenophobia is ultimately about its effect of
contributing to the process of othering, which pushes certain
groups of people to the fringes of community life, often of a
nation-state, but possibly also of a village, town, or country.54 If
comparison is to be used at all, it is helpful only when
xenophobia is conceived as creating the diffuse but politically
precise categories of “us” and “them,” separating those who
belong (natives) from those who do not belong (foreigners).55
Once this distinction and its impact are clear, it is easier to dig
further into whether the category of “foreigners” in a specific
52. See Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to
Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 27 (2013) (“The
lessons of anti-essentialism and intersectionality are that the oppressions
cannot be dismantled separately because they mutually reinforce each
other.”).
53. See generally Ramon Grosfoguel et al., ‘Racism’, Intersectionality, and
Migration Studies: Framing Some Theoretical Reflections, 22 IDENTITIES 635
(2015).
54. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. Shreya Atrey, Race Discrimination in EU Law After Jyske Finans, 55
COMMON MKT. L.R. 625, 636–37 (2018).

COMMENT: XENOPHOBIA & INTERSECTIONALITY

1019

context is co-constituted by multiple racial (color, descent,
ethnicity, and national origin) and non-racial (nationality,
religion, language, culture, and class) grounds. Thus, the
question to be asked is not whether foreigners comprise a single
racially determined group, but whether actual or perceived
foreigners are discriminated against such that the treatment
meted out to them has the effect of rendering them as outcasts
from a political community who are in turn defined by racial and
other grounds of discrimination.56
CONCLUSION
Paradigmatic cases of xenophobic discrimination
(expressed in statements like “go back to where you come from”)
discriminate against their victims because they are not
considered as “belonging to” a nation or a society.57 This political
idea of belongingness to a particular community is in turn
co-constituted by an admixture of racial and non-racial
grounds.58 Yet, discrimination based on belongingness falls by
the wayside of racial discrimination because it is not considered
to be based primarily on racial grounds. Instead, potential cases
of xenophobic discrimination may be better identified by first
recognizing how xenophobic discrimination has its basis in both
racial and non-racial grounds which cannot easily be
disentangled, and then judging xenophobia via its impact or
effect of pushing its victims to the margins of a political
community.

56. A similar logic underpins footnote four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), which describes discrimination against
discrete and insular minorities in terms of lack of access from normal political
processes. Id. at 152 n.4 (describing this prejudice as “a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”); see generally JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
57. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.

